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Neither Confirm nor Deny: Secrecy and Disclosure in Undercover Policing  
 
1. Introduction 
When, if ever, should police reveal or confirm the identities of undercover officers 
and the tactics they use? This question has recently become the focus of heated debate 
in the UK, following a string of high-profile scandals and the subsequent 
establishment of the first-ever public inquiry into undercover policing. That inquiry is 
ongoing at the time of writing. It is investigating allegations (and some proven cases) 
that undercover police officers engaged in a range of scandalous activities. The 
allegations are, in brief, that a top-secret unit called the Special Demonstration Squad 
(SDS), formed in 1968, operated for decades monitoring British 'subversives' -  
environmental activists, anti-racist groups and animal rights campaigners amongst 
others. Its unofficial motto was apparently "By Any Means Necessary". Officers stole 
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the identities of dead children and used them as aliases with which to go underground 
for years. They engaged in sex and intimate relationships, including marriages in 
which they fathered children with activists, to build their credibility. They were 
allegedly ordered to find "dirt" on activist groups whose purpose was to uncover 
allegations of police corruption. And there were purported attempts to smear and 
discredit the families of a black teenager, whose murder the police were criticized for 
not bothering to investigate properly by an official inquiry. In response to a wave of 
such allegations, the words of a popular tabloid newspaper summed up public feeling 
(in characteristically sensationalist language) thus:  
As our cops are shamed by cover-ups and corruption, we ask: can we ever trust 
them? Today, in what amounts to a national crisis of confidence, they look less 
like  the long arm of the law and more like an organised conspiracy against the 
people they are meant to protect.1 
The UK government’s aim in setting up a public inquiry is to shed critical light on the 
conduct, culture, and oversight of undercover policing in the UK with a view to 
making recommendations for future policy and practice and, more generally, restoring 
public confidence and trust in what has become a seriously discredited tactic.   
 Yet the use of a public inquiry -which by definition operates under a 
presumption of openness- to investigate undercover policing -which by definition 
operates under a presumption of secrecy- has proven problematic. Participants and 
witnesses to the inquiry are bitterly divided on the issue of how much information 
about the activities and identities of undercover officers should be revealed and to 
whom. On one side, those who suspect they have been victims of police misconduct 
argue that the aims of the inquiry will not be achieved unless historic injustices are 
fully acknowledged; on the other, police insist that maintaining secrecy with respect 
to undercover is the only way to protect the safety of officers and their families and to 
ensure the continued effectiveness of a vital policing tool. Deciding where the correct 
balance between these competing interests lies has become a key dilemma facing the 
inquiry; indeed, the first year of its work has been devoted exclusively to resolving 
the issue of just how open and public its investigation should be. 
 This paper does not take sides in this debate. Neither does it defend a position 
on how public inquiries should resolve such dilemmas in the future. Rather, its aim is 
to improve the clarity and rigor of the debate by shedding critical light on a particular 
set of arguments put forward in this context, namely those that appeal to what will be 
referred to as a priori rationales for secrecy. Such arguments are interesting for a 
number of reasons. Though established legal opinion in this area is that decisions 
about disclosure should be made on the basis of a judgement about the balance of 
interests in any particular case, appeals to a priori arguments render empirical 
argument largely redundant and thus enable police to avoid conducting the risk 
assessment that such a balancing implies. What is more, they are taken by police to be 
so weighty that they are regularly called upon to defend secrecy even in the face of 
widespread unofficial disclosure, for example, when undercover officers write books 
about their experiences or otherwise publicly self-identify.2 And, they are cited often 
and relied upon heavily by a variety of non-police state actors seeking to justify 
secrecy in their activities. Thus government departments, local authorities, security 
agencies and counsel to all of the above regularly appeal to these a priori arguments in 
a wide range of contexts in which requests for disclosure are made, notably in 
response to the expanding use of Freedom of Information submissions. The fact that 
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these arguments are used widely, relied upon heavily, and yet are (conveniently) 
difficult to refute by appeal to evidence makes them deserving of careful scrutiny.  
 Two a priori arguments are considered, starting with the most important.  
Each is then analyzed according to the following approach: first, there is a description 
of how the argument is used in practice; then an attempt is made to specify the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the argument’s application; and finally the 
contingent considerations that make the argument more or less weighty in any given 
case are identified. The aim of this analysis is to provide greater insight into the 
structure, scope and limits of these arguments and in doing so to sharpen our 
appreciation of what is actually at stake when different kinds of requests for 
disclosure are made. This, in turn, should help decision-makers in a range of state 
agencies reach more considered conclusions about the value of maintaining secrecy in 
different contexts.  
 The overall thrust of argument put forward in this paper is that the a priori 
arguments considered are less effective in sealing the case for secrecy than is often 
assumed by those who make them but also by those whom they seek to persuade. This 
overreaching occurs in one or more of the following ways; they are taken to apply in a 
broader range of cases than they in fact do; they are taken to carry more weight in the 
balance of interests than they in fact do; and/or they are taken to obviate the need for a 
case-specific risk assessment more often than they in fact do. If correct, these claims 
do not imply that there exist no compelling reasons to maintain secrecy about 
undercover policing as a default position. But they do suggest that that police and 
other agencies need to work harder to defend their decision to maintain secrecy when 
questions of historical police misconduct and abuse of power are at stake. 
 Finally, some additional features of the argument put forward here should be 
noted. The context and examples given are parochial to the UK, though the analysis 
and conclusions are relevant to any jurisdiction in which arguments of the sort 
rehearsed here are furthered.3 The context of the argumentation is undercover 
policing, but the analysis is relevant to any context in which the specific arguments 
are cited --and there are many.4 Finally, references to and engagement with existing 
work on the ethics of undercover will not feature prominently in the discussion to 
follow. This is because the focus of that body of work is on the justifiability of the 
tactics and methods used rather than on the issue of whether and to what extent to lift 
the cover when things go wrong.5 The arguments will instead draw heavily on the 
reasoning articulated by the UK government and courts in recent test cases focusing 
on this issue. The paper will attempt to relate this to the – currently scant  – 
philosophical literature analyzing the conflict between secrecy and accountability in a 
democracy.  
 
 
2. Background 
This paper began by posing the question: when, if ever, should police reveal or 
confirm the identities of undercover officers or the tactics they use? Put the question 
to any senior police officer in the UK and the response will almost inevitably be 
‘never’. The reasons hardly need spelling out: undercover operations only work to the 
extent that they remain secret; blow the cover and not only is the operation over, but 
the safety of police officers is at risk. What is more, useful tactics have been revealed 
and thereby rendered useless in the future. For these reasons, the guidance offered to 
UK police in the form of authorised professional practice6 is to maintain a position of 
‘neither confirming nor denying’ any facts about undercover officers or the tactics 
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they use (a stance now commonly referred to in the UK, and hereafter in this paper, as 
NCND). 
 But what if the operation is not ongoing but historical? And what if there are 
compelling reasons to believe (perhaps via reliable reports from investigative 
journalists) that the operation contravened police regulation -say by intentionally 
targeting peaceful protest groups? What if it involved gross misconduct sustained 
over a number of years, or even systematic and authorized abuses of police power?  
In such cases, in which things have gone wrong in ways that need to be righted, 
maintaining secrecy with respect to the identities and activities of officers involved 
comes at a cost. Part of the cost is best described as involving the interests in justice 
of those individuals directly affected by such actions: just as a victim of overt police 
brutality has a right to a process by which the wrongs done to them are acknowledged 
and redressed, so too do victims of abusive police deception. And part of the cost 
involves the interests of the public at large, interests in being reassured that coercive 
state powers exercised in their name are deployed in a manner that is not only 
effective but also legitimate and accountable.  
 Let us take a moment to expound this last claim about the way in which the 
public interest is engaged in this context, because doing so will help clarify discussion 
later. There is a clear public interest in having a police force equipped with 
considerable powers, including undercover powers, in order to prevent and prosecute 
rights violations in the form of crime. This interest is furthered in practice by 
(amongst other things) the establishment of reliable oversight mechanisms both 
within and external to police forces, whose role it is to ensure that powers are being 
used for legitimate purposes and in a proportionate manner. In order to fulfill that 
role, such mechanisms must be given access to confidential material that remains off-
limits to the public. This is how the demands of secrecy and accountability are 
typically reconciled in a democracy. When such oversight fails, as it sometimes does, 
secrecy can become pernicious. In short, it can be used to conceal failings, 
misconduct, and abuses of power, and thus to undermine the legitimacy of the 
institution whose privilege it is.  
 In his 1999 article entitled ‘Democratic Secrecy’, Dennis Thompson analyses 
this conflicting dynamic between secrecy and accountability, which he calls the 
‘accountability/secrecy dilemma’. He argues that one of the hazards of secrecy 
without adequate accountability is the emergence of ‘institutional hypocrisy’, by 
which he means: 
 
a disparity between the publicly avowed purposes of an institution and its actual 
performance or function that develops over time as the secrecy under which an 
institution or aspects of it functions enables practices that would not receive 
democratic consent and these become so systematic that the institution or 
aspects of it come to serve purposes other than those for which it was 
established… 
 
Thompson’s analysis is forward-looking, offering insights into how oversight 
mechanisms should be designed so as to maximize the benefits of secrecy without 
undermining accountability. It does not consider how the accountability/secrecy 
dilemma should be approached when such mechanisms have failed systematically in 
the past. Neither does it consider how it should be managed when there is a need for 
remedial and transitional measures to both redress specific injustices that have 
resulted from such failure and provide the basis for reform of oversight arrangements. 
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Such considerations might be especially pertinent to cases involving the police, if we 
accept the British model of ‘policing by consent', which makes accountability, trust 
and legitimacy central to the justification of policing. 
 Perhaps the first useful observation we can make about this challenge is that, 
when institutional hypocrisy is revealed and there is a clear moral imperative to 
acknowledge and redress it, the old conflict between secrecy and accountability 
reemerges with a vengeance. For, as long as the power to reveal and conceal 
information about undercover operations remains the privilege of the institution 
accused of hypocrisy, that institution faces a glaring conflict of interest: the very same 
privilege that enabled it to use illegitimate means and/or pursue illegitimate aims can 
now serve as a cloak with which to avoid criticism and calls for reform.7 At such 
pivotal moments, the need for greater transparency and accountability is greater than 
ever. This is precisely the situation that has arisen in relation to undercover policing in 
the UK. 
 As already mentioned, the government’s response to this has been to appoint a 
public inquiry, a move which reflects a belief on the part of the UK government that 
more routine processes for revealing and correcting wrongs by the police, such as 
litigation and criminal law proceedings, would suffice neither to address the problems 
identified, nor to restore the damage to public confidence caused. This belief seems 
well-founded, for the following reasons. Focused as they are on the actions of specific 
individuals, legal processes are not particularly effective at revealing and redressing 
cases of institutional hypocrisy, ‘bad organizational culture’, and systemic problems 
such as ineffective oversight or excessively permissive spheres of discretion.8 In 
addition, while such proceedings may deal with known or suspected cases of 
individual abuses, they would not reveal cases that are currently unknown. Not only 
would this deny as-yet-unidentified victims the chance to seek justice, it would also 
conceal from the public the full extent of the illegitimacy that has occurred, risking an 
inadequate appreciation of the extent of reform needed. Finally, a more prosaic 
consideration: UK judges have not demonstrated a willingness to second-guess the 
statements of police with respect to the security implications of disclosures in the 
past.9  
 Despite the fact that a public inquiry operates by definition on a presumption 
of openness,10 police submissions to initial hearings of the UK inquiry asserted an 
intention to maintain a position of NCND with respect to the identities of officers and 
tactics used in almost all envisaged cases.11 This is problematic, not because a public 
inquiry removes the police’s right to refuse to disclose (it does not), but because 
established legal opinion is that the decision to neither confirm nor deny some fact 
must be made on a case-by-case basis, not as a general or blanket policy. In the words 
of Lord Pitchford, the chair of the undercover inquiry: 
 
In each case an assessment of the public interest is made. Disclosure is made 
only when in the particular circumstances of the case the level of the risk of 
harm that may follow the particular disclosure sought is sufficiently low that the 
public interest in disclosure can prevail.12 
 
In other words, the balance between accountability and secrecy is achieved by means 
of a rule stating that when disclosure is sought for reasons that are prima facie 
legitimate, including reasons of alleged misconduct or other police injustice, the 
police must defend continued secrecy by means of a risk assessment and present the 
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results of this, though not the confidential detail, to the court (or in this case, the chair 
of the inquiry).  
 The moral purpose served by the requirement to provide a risk assessment is 
that of ensuring that secrecy is not used to conceal wrongdoing or deflect 
investigation but to protect a public interest. The provision of a risk assessment 
demonstrating a threat to the public interest does not resolve the dilemma between 
secrecy and accountability; on the contrary, it is evidence both of the existence of a 
genuine dilemma and of the challenge it poses. In the context of normal freedom of 
information requests, the police both conduct the risk assessment and determine the 
correct balance between the competing public interests. But in the context of court 
cases or public inquiries the balancing exercise is carried out by the independent 
arbiter, in this case the chair of the Inquiry. 
 The need for a case-by-case risk assessment is regularly acknowledged in UK 
police submissions to the public inquiry, a fact that seems inconsistent with their even 
more frequent assertion that NCND must be maintained in all but rare and exceptional 
cases. Thus, for example, the National Police Chief’s Council recognizes the need for 
a case-by-case risk assessment, citing their awareness of the unambiguous assertion of 
the UK appeal court13 that neither confirming nor denying  
 
is not a 'doctrine' to be hoisted up and saluted on every occasion. Rather, it will 
always be for the party claiming reliance on NCND to clearly articulate the 
potential damage which would arise were there to be a departure from NCND 
and it should be considered on a case by case basis.14  
 
The reason this seems inconsistent with the police’s actual insistence on secrecy as a 
modus operandi for the inquiry is that it is not unreasonable to suppose that the 
‘potential damage’ is likely to vary considerably between cases. For example, it 
seems plausible that the potential damage is likely to be much greater when the 
information relates to the identity of an undercover officer than to the use of a specific 
tactic,15 or when it relates to facts about an operation that ended very recently, rather 
than one that ended decades ago. In order for the police’s recognition of the need to 
undertake a case-by-case risk assessment to be rendered consistent with their claim 
that (almost) all future requests for disclosure will be met with an NCND response, 
they must be convinced that those future cases will both inevitably and invariably fail 
the risk assessment. It is to a critical appraisal of the basis for such a conviction that 
the focus of this paper now turns.  
 What kinds of reasons do police have for believing that it will (almost) never 
be in the public interest for them to either confirm or deny facts about undercover 
operations? Two distinct but compatible reasons are typically given. The first is the 
argument that requests for disclosure must be met consistently with a refusal to 
confirm or deny, otherwise dangerous precedents will be created. The second claims 
that to disclose even limited and discreet details of undercover policing risks 
revealing far more than is desired by providing criminals inadvertently with the last 
piece in the information ‘puzzle’.  
 In the introduction to this paper these arguments were referred to as a priori. 
Though the term does not feature in public debate in relation to such arguments, it is 
useful for our present purposes, because it invites contrast with arguments whose 
soundness is contingent upon consultation of empirical considerations. There are two 
ways in which the arguments considered can be described as a-priori. First, they are 
taken to apply to all or nearly all cases in which requests for disclosure are made, 
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irrespective of the distinctive features of such cases; second, they are taken to carry 
both priority and decisive weight in the balance of interests, thus (somewhat 
paradoxically) rendering such a balance redundant. In sum, insofar as they do in fact 
demonstrate the need for secrecy in any given case, these arguments do so in the 
abstract, without reference to any specific facts about that particular case. It is this a 
priori feature that lends these arguments to use as reasons for maintaining NCND as a 
policy or blanket response to requests for information about undercover policing, 
thereby obviating (or evading, depending on how one sees it) the need for a case-by-
case risk assessment.  
 The weight and scope of application of each of these arguments is different, as 
will become clear in the analysis to follow. However, for the purposes of this paper it 
is assumed that if either of these arguments is convincing, then the case for a blanket 
policy of NCND is strong and police are justified in maintaining it. It is then argued 
that in fact neither of them justifies such a policy. Therefore, it is concluded, police 
continue to be obliged by considerations of the just balance between secrecy and 
accountability, to undertake risk assessments for each case in which disclosure is 
requested. This conclusion does not exclude the possibility that in practice all risk 
assessments end up favoring an NCND response to the request. But that is beside the 
point; the point is that the potential damage of not giving such a response must be 
demonstrated in each case rather than assumed in advance. Let us now turn to a 
consideration of each of those arguments. 
  
 
3. A priori arguments for secrecy 
 
The argument from danger and consistency: the case of Scappaticci 
In May 2003 reports were published in the British media that the security services’ 
most valuable informer in the IRA, an agent known as Stakeknife, could be named as 
the Belfast man Freddie Scappaticci. Scappaticci quickly moved to deny the 
allegation and began legal proceedings to force the UK government to do the same, 
citing threats to his life, including the placing of a pipe bomb in his house, in support 
of his case for disclosure. The UK government responded by neither confirming or 
denying the alleged facts. The argument put forward by the government in support of 
its position is cited often in the context of debates about disclosure of information 
about undercover operations, in order to show that consistency is necessary even in 
cases in which there appears to be a legitimate interest in disclosure. It has featured 
prominently in the current debate in the UK over disclosure of what is alleged to be 
systematic historical misconduct and abuse of police powers, as police appeal to it in 
their demands that the public inquiry conceal the identities and tactics of undercover 
officers allegedly involved. It is replicated here in full: 
 
The Government has a long established policy in respect of the identification of 
agents. The policy involves the principle that the identity of agents is neither 
confirmed nor denied (hence it is sometimes referred to as the NCND policy) 
as-  
• to confirm that a person is an agent would place that person in immediate and 
obvious danger; 
 
• to deny that a person is an agent may place another person in immediate and 
obvious danger; and 
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• to comment either way in one case raises a clear inference the Government 
refuses to comment in another case that it has something to hide in that case, ie 
the inference will be that the individual in that case is an agent, and he may be 
subject to reprisals (and his life may be at risk) as a result.16 
 
The argument is a general one about the effect of state disclosure of information about 
the identity of any informer on the aggregate or overall risks to informers. Its 
soundness becomes especially clear when we consider the nature of the interests at 
stake and the extent to which legitimate interests would in fact be protected by 
disclosure. For there is no legitimate interest of the public in knowing who is or who 
is not an informer for the security services. Indeed, the only people who want such 
information do so in order to further illegitimate purposes, namely the infliction of 
serious harm, maybe even murder, on anyone directly or indirectly thus identified. 
Agents have a legitimate interest in being protected from such harm, but they have no 
right that that interest be served by means of the provision of official information 
about their status as informers or otherwise. In other words, their interest lies in the 
cessation of threats, not in disclosure as such. This interest can be protected by the 
state in the same way it protects any other individual subject to harassment and threats 
to life, namely via police protection and police investigation and prosecution of those 
carrying out such crimes. The absence of any legitimate interests in disclosure means 
there is no prima facie obligation on the part of the authorities to make a public 
disclosure. On the contrary, the argument set out above provides a prima facie case 
for maintaining NCND. 
 Scappaticci’s lawyer responded to the submission of this argument by 
emphasizing the seriousness of the threat to his client’s life and claiming that this 
distinguished his case from others, a fact which, he argued, had not been taken into 
account adequately by the government. In short, his complaint was that the 
government was applying the policy in a blanket way, without conducting the 
requisite risk assessment. An application for judicial review of the NCND decision 
was lodged with the courts. The court rejected it, pointing out that the government 
had made statements about the specifics of the case, and that these served only to 
strengthen the prima facie case already made. Those statements were to the effect that 
the paramilitary terrorists currently threatening to kill Scappaticci had their own 
methods of ascertaining the identity of informers and that the statement of a minister 
would in any case be unlikely by itself to allay any suspicions they had.17 Even if it 
were true that by providing a statement the threat to Scappaticci would be alleviated, 
such a move would only displace the threat elsewhere, as it provided reasons for the 
IRA in its search for Stakeknife to begin to cast suspicion on others.  
 Emphasizing the seriousness of the threat, as Scappaticci’s lawyer did, does not 
undermine this last of the government’s points. On the contrary, the more serious the 
threat to the agent in question, the more serious the threat displaced to others as a 
result of disclosure; raising the stakes on one side of the argument merely raises them 
on the other. There are conceivable exceptions to this. For example, if the agent in 
question (in this case Stakeknife) had died, then full disclosure of his identity would 
protect Scappaticci without displacing the threat to him to anyone else. Yet, such a 
move would create a precedent that would support dangerous inferences in the future 
because a refusal to confirm or deny would now imply the continued existence of an 
agent. For this and all of the reasons provided above, the argumentation provided by 
the government in support of NCND in respect of Scappaticci seems 
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straightforwardly valid and conclusive.  
 The question we must now address is whether and to what extent that reasoning 
holds for undercover operations. Recall that police in the UK appeal to the reasoning 
provided by the government in Scappaticci to defend their stance of NCND as 
providing not only a prima facie but also an a priori case in favour of NCND. In other 
words, they take the reasoning in Scappaticci to apply so convincingly to the realm of 
undercover policing as to obviate the need for a case-by-case risk assessment. In order 
to assess whether this position is justified, we must first identify the conditions that 
should pertain in order for the Scappaticci reasoning to hold and then consider the 
extent to which they apply in cases of undercover policing.  
 The following claim is now defended: the weight of the case against disclosure 
made by Scappaticci reasoning is a function of the seriousness of the harm threatened. 
If the risk of harm is very slight, the reasoning still applies, but does not make as 
strong a case against disclosure as it would if the risk of harm were very great. If there 
is no risk of harm then the reasons given in the Scappaticci case for refusing to 
disclose (and only those reasons) disappear. They disappear not only in relation to the 
specific case, but also in relation to the creation of a precedent. This is because, in the 
absence of a threat of harm, the precedent created by disclosure would only justify the 
inference that ‘police might disclose when there is no risk of harm’. Such inferences 
would not be weapons in the hands of those who wish to do harm to those identified 
as agents, because the very fact that there are individuals who would wish to do harm 
to those identified would disqualify the case from being captured by the precedent. 
 From this we can draw support for the continued assertion of a prima facie 
presumption against disclosure both in the case of informers working –like 
Stakeknife- for the security services and for undercover police. In the case of the 
security services, the risk of harm is, in nearly all conceivable cases likely to be very 
high, because the use of agents is restricted to matters of national security, which by 
their very nature involve serious threats to life and serious criminality such as, for 
example, terrorism. A similar case can be made for undercover police officers, 
because their use is in principle authorised only in the context of investigations of 
serious offences. However, with respect to undercover policing, it is less easy to draw 
support from this for the assertion of an a priori case against disclosure. For 
experience shows that there is a range of different cases in which the risk of harm 
from disclosure is negligible. At least three such cases are discernable, each of which 
are now considered in turn.  
 The first case occurs when the agent’s identity as an undercover officer has 
already been confirmed by the agent themselves, an event known as self-
identification. In DIL, a recent UK legal case brought by 5 women who suspect they 
were illegitimately duped into relationships with officers working undercover, the 
presiding judge, Justice Bean, rejected the police’s claim that it could maintain 
NCND in cases in which undercover officers had self-identified. In doing so, Bean 
reasoned that the act of self-identification itself exposes the agent to any danger such 
disclosure threatens to bring upon him. The harm has therefore already been done. 
Thus the justification for refusing the police the privilege of continued secrecy in 
cases of self-identification follows ‘not from a waiver of privilege attaching 
personally to the informer, but from the disappearance of the primary justification for 
the claim for secrecy, which is the protection of informers and the technique.”18 
 Now, it has been argued in submissions by the police to the inquiry that 
allowing self-disclosure to create an exception to NCND could over time lead to 
pressure on informers or undercover officer to out themselves.19 But this seems 
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unlikely. For one thing, such pressure would only be imposed by someone who knows 
already that the individual is an agent and wants to do them harm. If that is the case, 
then it makes more sense for the informer to seek protection from the police from 
those making the threats than to capitulate and self-identify, because the alternative is 
to risk being threatened by those who might react badly to being alerted to their role 
as an informer. In either case, the informant is subject to threats of harm from which 
they have a right to be protected by the state. 
 The second case in which disclosure threatens no or negligible harm thus 
negating the Scappaticci reasoning occurs when an agent’s identity has already been 
authoritatively confirmed by some relevant entity. Thus in relation to an officer whose 
undercover identity had been revealed by the Commissioner of the Metropolitan 
Police Service, it was argued (again by Justice Bean, in the DIL case) that further 
“reliance on the NCND policy to avoid admitting that he was an UCO is simply 
unsustainable.20 In reaching this conclusion, Justice Bean made no attempt to assess 
the existence or otherwise of a risk of harm to undercover officers or to the long-term 
effectiveness of the tactic. His argument was not substantive but formal- authoritative 
disclosure has already occurred; it follows that, whatever harm would be avoided by 
secrecy has already been done. Disclosing adds no additional risk of harm to that 
already posed. Therefore the primary reasoning provided by police in support of their 
refusal to disclose, namely the reasoning of the government in the Scappaticci case, 
simply did not apply.  
 While Justice Bean recognized that there could in principle be cases in which 
police disclosure would bring a risk of harm additional to that already done by self-
identification or other authoritative disclosure, he noted that police had provided no 
evidence to suggest that it would in the specific case in question. In other words, in 
the absence of a risk assessment by police suggesting additional harm, there was no 
reason to assume such harm would occur. Thus his reasoning can be summed up as 
supporting the claim that, while Scappaticci provides a prima facie case in favour of 
secrecy in undercover policing, self-identification or authoritative disclosure 
overturns that case.  
 The third case in which disclosure would not pose enough of a threat to harm 
for the Scappaticci argument for secrecy to apply is less straightforward and does 
involve the kind of substantive reasoning about the risks on both sides that Justice 
Bean refrained from when proposing the two exceptions just mentioned. Specifically, 
it involves reference to the existence of a threat of harm to agents by nefarious 
individuals. Assessing this threat involves in the first instance establishing the 
motivations either of those seeking disclosure or of those driving the request for it. In 
Scappaticci, those driving the request for disclosure were doing so for clearly 
nefarious reasons: they were terrorists whose aim was to find and kill Stakeknife, as 
they demonstrated by putting a pipe bomb in Freddie Scappaticci’s house. In contrast 
in the case of DIL, those requesting disclosure were not terrorists but members of 
peaceful protest groups; their motivations were not nefarious but rather involved a 
legitimate quest for justice. There is no reason to believe that they would be more 
likely to use the information disclosed to inflict harm on officers than there is reason 
to believe that victims of crime would pose a threat to those who are taken to court for 
the perpetration of those crimes. Neither is there reason to believe that there are others 
out there who would use this information to inflict harm on officers. This supposition 
is borne out by the fact that recent revelations in the British media about the identities 
of some of those officers have not been met with threats to life or other serious threats 
of harm.   
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  It is worth noting at this point that the options available to public inquiries 
(and indeed to police) dealing with requests for disclosure are more varied than a 
simple choice between disclosure that is fully public or no disclosure at all. 
Disclosures can in principle (and have in practice) been made to specific individuals 
who are deemed to have a legitimate interest in knowing and to pose no threat, on the 
condition that those individuals remain legally bound to refrain from sharing the 
information. Or, in the context of an investigation into police wrongdoing, ‘circles of 
confidentiality’ can be created, to enable the engagement of witnesses and other 
relevant individuals without disclosing beyond what is required by the demands of 
justice. Risk assessments carried out by police should pertain to all relevant options. 
 The points made thus far serve only to show that the reasoning that was put 
forward in Scappaticci -and is now cited as conclusive by police seeking to justify 
secrecy with respect to undercover- does not obviate the need for police to undertake 
case-by-case risk assessments when faced with requests for disclosure. That need is 
not obviated because, while it is a necessary condition of the application of that 
reasoning that a serious threat of harm exists, that condition is not met in at least three 
kinds of cases involving requests for disclosure: cases in which undercover officers 
have been identified by the police or equivalent authoritative source; cases in which 
they have self-identified as agents; and cases in which disclosure would not enable the 
carrying out of implicit or explicit threats to the safety of officers. For this reason, 
police cannot appeal to Scappaticci as a model response for all requests for 
disclosure; Scappaticci reasoning may well apply to the case in question, but whether 
it does or not is a matter for the police to demonstrate, not for the courts or the chair 
of a public inquiry to disprove. 
 Finally, none of this should be taken to imply that if Scappatici fails to apply 
then the case for non-disclosure has also failed. The case for or against disclosure is 
made only on the basis of a balance of interests, and this involves considerations 
beyond a mere demonstration that disclosure will not result in serious harm to an 
agent.  
 
 
The argument from the mosaic effect 
The second argument put forward by police as an a priori reason to assert secrecy in 
undercover policing is known as the ‘mosaic effect’ for reasons that will soon become 
clear. Before examining it in detail, some preliminary observations about the 
distinction between the mosaic effect and Scappaticci are in order. Whereas the 
reasoning from Scappaticci applies only in cases in which there is a real danger to 
agents, the mosaic effect applies even when no such danger is apparent. Whereas 
Scappaticci is used to defend secrecy around the identity of agents in particular, the 
mosaic effect is used to defend secrecy about any feature or aspect of undercover 
operations. The mosaic effect is taken to show not that disclosure always threatens 
serious harm to agents, but rather that it is impossible to assess that harm with 
sufficient certainty to justify ever taking the risk. Its distinctive feature is this apparent 
ability to justify blanket secrecy as a precautionary response to the inadequacy of 
case-by-case risk assessments.  
 The mosaic effect occurs when a piece of information disclosed after an 
apparently reassuring risk assessment is combined with other pieces of information 
already in the possession of those with bad intentions, to reveal identities or tactics 
and thus to cause harm to officers and/or to scupper operations. Technological 
developments are often taken to make the risk of indirect and unintentional but 
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nevertheless harmful disclosures higher, given the possibilities afforded to criminals 
for cross-referencing open-source and other forms of information. Disclosure of 
specific tactics could in principle be combined with information about individuals to 
reveal their identities, while disclosure of identities could expose and thereby render 
redundant valuable tactics. Because we can never know for sure what kind of 
information the bad guys already have, we can never know whether the piece we are 
about to disclose completes the mosaic. The National Police Chiefs Council 
articulates the argument thus: 
 
The determination and quest for information from individuals and organisations, 
extensive research capabilities afforded by the internet and modern 
communication technologies, creates a mosaic effect that is capable of 
identifying, the covert methods and techniques used by law enforcement, 
endangering individual undercover operatives, their families and colleagues and 
may ultimately even result in the loss of life.21 
 
This reasoning embodies a precautionary approach to risk-assessment in the area of 
undercover policing, i.e. the absence of certainty about the risks to agents from 
disclosure is itself taken to justify continued secrecy.  
 The mosaic effect highlights a genuine limit to the ability of risk assessments 
to provide the kind of reassurances that are reliable enough to support disclosure with 
confidence. But its success in providing a case for jettisoning those risk assessments 
in favour of an a priori case for secrecy is limited, for at least three reasons. First, 
uncertainty about risks is not by itself sufficient reason for taking none, especially 
when the costs of continued secrecy are high. Secondly, in some cases, namely at 
least those named in the discussion of Scappaticci above, the risks of disclosure (both 
current and future) are negligible. Thirdly, a precautionary approach cites the fact that 
we don’t know something as a reason to ignore or discount what we do know. As a 
result, it obscures the fact that the risk of harm threatened by disclosure is likely to be 
smaller in some cases than others and that this likelihood should inform and be 
reflected in final decisions about disclosure.  
 This latter point merits more detailed explanation. The risk of disclosure is 
likely to be higher in some cases than others because it is a function of the following 
three considerations: a) the existence of people or groups with nefarious intentions in 
relation to undercover officers; b) the sophistication of the fact-finding capabilities of 
those with nefarious intentions; and c) the likelihood that the piece of information 
whose disclosure is requested could be combined with existing information and 
thereby rendered identifying. It is not necessary here to make an attempt to determine 
the risk threshold at which each of these considerations (or indeed at which the 
combination of all three) begin to weigh in favor of continued secrecy. The point 
being made is simply that the case for individual risk assessments is not overturned by 
the possibility of a mosaic effect. On the contrary, the uncertainty posed by the 
recognition of the risk of a mosaic effect should be incorporated into the risk 
assessment. 
 
3. Outstanding issues 
Thus far it has been argued that neither of the two arguments against disclosure most 
commonly voiced by police do not, contrary to what is often supposed, provide an 
exemption from the duty to conduct a case-by-case assessment of the risks of such 
disclosure. In addition, some suggestions regarding the content of risk assessments 
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have been put forward. Case-by-case risk assessments provide objective reasons for 
secrecy in the face of legitimate requests for disclosure (or at least evidence of their 
existence). The requirement to provide them is intended to prevent police using the 
same privilege that was used as a cloak for misconduct and abuse to evade or deflect 
accountability for those wrongs, thus going some small way to resolving 
accountability/secrecy dilemma.  
 But just how small a contribution are such risk assessments likely to make? At 
least two features of the process they form a part of lead to the suspicion that the 
focus on them in this paper (and indeed in the work of the Inquiry) is no more than an 
exercise in splitting hairs and what is more an unwelcome distraction from the 
fundamental moral question at hand, namely how to do justice to victims of 
undercover police misconduct given the need for secrecy. The first of these features is 
the fact that such assessments are the privilege of the police, who have serious vested 
interests in shaping them in such as way as to support secrecy. The second is that 
judges are in fact disinclined to question the police about the basis for such 
assessments, considering correctly that their lack of access to the evidence means they 
lack the authority to do so. As Rahul Sagar explains in his paper on combatting the 
abuse of state secrecy, both of these features arise from the structure of transparency 
and accountability mechanisms:  
 
… given that we wish to scrutinize the executive because we fear the abuse of 
state secrecy, asking officials to calculate the harm caused by disclosure is like 
asking the suspect to provide the evidence. In other words, the fundamental flaw 
in proposals to increase transparency is structural in nature because their 
success is destined to rely upon the faithfulness of officials, which is ironic 
since the point of the whole exercise is to prove rather than assume their good 
faith.22 
  
The risk is that the assessments are an empty formality, by which police merely 
reassert their immunity from meaningful accountability for past wrongs while 
maintaining a veneer of transparency. In which case, of course, they seem hardly 
worth defending.  
 One approach to dealing with this conflict of interest would be to appoint an 
independent body to oversee the risk assessments. The problem of judicial deference 
and of partisanship could be addressed by appointing a single independent 
ombudsman, perhaps along the lines of existing mechanisms such as the UK’s highly 
effective Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation.23 Alternatively, the issue 
could be brought to existing parliamentary committees for consideration, as these are 
less likely to suffer from the distortions of political partisanship when scrutinizing a 
non-executive arm of government such as the police. Both such approaches could 
produce opinions that might form the basis for guidance for how future cases should 
be dealt with. The general gist and some redacted sections of such guidance could be 
made public for scrutiny, thus both providing the basis for enhanced accountability 
and making approaches to disclosure more consistent. Unless and until such options 
are seriously explored, the main challenge to the police’s production of self-serving 
risk assessments will continue to be provided by the steady stream of leaks, 
confessional publications, and investigative journalism that currently characterizes 
this area of police activity. 
 
Conclusion 
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Secrecy is a necessary prerequisite of certain valuable state functions, among which 
we can count with confidence undercover policing. In a democracy, the secrecy 
afforded to the police must be rendered accountable. This is usually achieved via 
effective oversight mechanisms, which have access to material rightly concealed from 
the public. When such mechanisms fail, as they have done quite spectacularly in the 
UK, a recalibration of the balance between secrecy and accountability is required. In 
the short run, this may involve greater-than-usual, indeed exceptional openness. This 
may be necessary not only to attain justice for those mistreated, but also to reestablish 
trust and, perhaps most importantly, in order to reveal where and why things went 
wrong so that the same mistakes will not be repeated in the future.  
 Recent attempts by UK police to employ a priori reasoning in support of 
secrecy in order to resist the requirement to perform risk assessments have been 
contested here. Accountability in a democracy does not require disclosure of all 
information held by the state, nor even of the specific reasons why such information 
should be protected or concealed. But it does require some objective reassurance that 
such reasons in fact exist, which is precisely what risk-assessments are designed to 
provide. The public is owed that much by those who act in their name. 
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